<認罪協商雜記 >(note of American-style plea bargining)
A. Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978)
Q:uestionDoes the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibit state prosecutors from carrying out a threat made during plea negotiations to re-indict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged?
判決書非常非常慎重的指出：PB出自檢辯雙方爲了避免審判的相互的利益（the mutuality of advantage）,為了鼓勵協商法院必須接受「檢方的利益在於說服被告放棄無罪抗辯的權利」這種簡單的現實(The prosecutor has a legitimate interest in persuading a defendant to relinquish his or her right to plead not guilty.)。檢察官有著廣泛的自由裁量權，只要不是故意違反公正的基本標準，諸如因為種族、信仰而有所偏私，執法中「有意識的選擇」將是合憲的。但法官也認識到，這樣的裁量權有淺在被濫用的可能，因此，檢方裁量權的運用必須遵守一定的憲法限制，Stewart法官認為，檢察官的行為仍要符合憲法第14修正案正當程式條款的要求。本案檢方此裁量權的運用並不違憲。
七 (不得為協商判決之情形 (一) )刑訴法第455條之4第1項第3款所謂「合意顯有不當」，例如：被告雖已認罪，惟法院認應諭知無罪之情形。又第5款所謂「法院認定之事實顯與協商合意之事實不符者」....
八 (不得為協商判決之情形 (二) )....如被告係犯數罪，且有裁判上一罪關係，而被告僅就較輕之犯罪事實認罪者，因被告尚有其他較重之犯罪事實....法院即不得為協商判決；如被告所犯數罪應分論併罰，雖有部分犯罪係屬4款不得聲請協商判決者，法院仍得就其他部分犯罪為協商判決，惟協商合意內容含「被告願受緩刑宣告」之情形，而嗣後應依刑法第75條第1項第2款撤銷緩刑宣告者，可認有....「合意顯有不當」之事由，即不宜為協商判決。
B. U.S. v. Pollard (D.C. Cir)
Issue: Are wired pleas unconstitutional? 人的包裹式認罪，是否合憲?
D claimed the gov’t coerced his guilty plea by linking his wife’s plea to his own. 檢方要求被告及共犯被告之妻ㄧ起認罪。
Holding:“Where as here, the gov’t had probable cause to arrest and prosecute both defendants in a related crime, and there is no suggestion that the government conducted itself in bad faith in an effort to generate additional leverage over the D, we think a wired plea is constitutional.”
判決審查的步驟:ccp12211)、plea wiring does not violate the Constitution.2)、第二步，適用voluntary rule. Check if porsecutors act in good faith.法院在判決中做了正反的假設，並且指出倘若認定違憲的結果，亦未必有利於整個共犯結構獲取更輕的刑度，這樣的假設性認定的論證方式，較少見於台灣判決書中。而且與其討論合憲性問題，不若說這是道德與倫理議題的取決。
C. Newton v Rumery: 1987
爭點在於檢辯間針對檢察官利用 "release-dismissal agreements"換取被告放棄其對政府提出民事賠償訴訟(警察不法行為)的權利，而不對被告提出控訴，是否違法? 美國聯邦最高法院認為不違法，不過日後學者對此等特定的認罪協商合約也抱著頗為懷疑的態度。
Fact: After learning that a friend, David Champy, had been indicted by a New Hampshire county grand jury for aggravated felonious sexual assault, respondent sought more information from a mutual acquaintance, who coincidently was the victim of the assault and was expected to be the principal witness against Champy. The victim called the town of Newton's Chief of Police and told him that respondent was trying to force her to drop the charges against Champy. Respondent was arrested and accused of the state-law felony of tampering with a witness. Respondent's attorney and the prosecutor negotiated an agreement whereby the prosecutor would dismiss the charges against him if he would agree to release any claims he might have against the town, its officials, or the victim for any harm caused by his arrest. Three days later, he signed the "release-dismissal agreement," and the criminal charges against him were dropped. Ten months later, he filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Federal District Court, alleging that the town and its officers had violated his constitutional rights by arresting him, defaming him, and imprisoning him falsely.
1. The question whether the policies underlying § 1983 (Civil Rights Act 1871) may in some circumstances render a waiver of the right to sue thereunder unenforceable is one of federal law, to be resolved by reference to traditional common-law principles. The relevant principle is that a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement. .2. Although in some cases release-dimissal agreements may infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and of society as a whole, the mere possibility of harm to such interests does not call for a per se rule invalidating all such agreements. The risk, publicity, and expense of a criminal...( The term "release-dismissal agreement" encompasses any agreement between a public prosecutor and a potential criminal defendant in which the prosecutor agrees to dismiss or reduce criminal charges in consideration for the defendant releasing a civil rights claim against the police or other government officials. )
D. US v Mezzanatto認罪協商程序中被告之陳述，在協商沒有成立之後，被檢方用來彈劾，仍然可行。相關的案件尚有 US v Burch 1998。一篇文章以經濟分析角度來質疑:倘若認罪協商是契約的一種，那麼上開判決導致的結論將使認罪協商變成是「單方合約」，事實上讓檢方成為最大的贏家。
E.檢方違約時的救濟為何? Santobello v. NY案中法院僅表示檢方不能違約，但就救濟手段乏進一步的說明。另外，在Mabry v Johnson (1984) ㄧ案中，檢方第一次提出的條件，日後被告表示接受時，檢方卻發現其offer的第一次的條件有誤，而提出第二次的條件，被告對檢方第一次的offer的條件有無憲法上的權利呢？(要求檢方遵守第一次的條件?) 答案是:沒有。所以藉由這些案件必須對PB是合約一種這樣的說詞抱持著一定的懷疑。
By Wan-Li Yang
Fed. 20 2007